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SEARCHING FOR A NEEDLE IN A HAYSTACK: THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF POLICE DNA DRAGNETS
SEPIDEH ESMAILI*

INTRODUCTION

Shannon Kohler was given a "choice" when he was approached by the
Baton Rouge Police.' He could either allow the police to swab the inside of
his mouth to analyze his DNA or he could refuse and, according to the
police, be subjected to a court order and public speculation that he was a
serial killer. 2 The police warned that the court order would most likely get
Kohler's name into the newspapers as being uncooperative in the investigation of the murders of four women and as a possible suspect in the crimes. 3
Kohler eventually provided a sample of his DNA to the police. 4 The irony
of this situation was that Kohler was not even a suspect in the four murders. 5 He did not drive the type of car that witnesses saw at the scenes of
the crimes, and he had phone records showing he was at home on the nights
that the murders occurred. 6 The Baton Rouge Police, however, targeted
Kohler and nearly 1,200 other men for DNA testing based on paltry connections to the victims, such as Kohler's having once worked on the street
7
on which the police found the first victim's cell phone.
In less than twenty years, "DNA dragnets"-the mass warrantless
DNA testing of individuals whom authorities have neither probable cause
nor reasonable suspicion to believe perpetrated a crime, but who merely
live or work near a crime scene-has become a practice increasingly util* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007. The author wishes to thank her family
for their love and support. The author also thanks Professor David Rudstein for his feedback.
1. David M. Halbfinger, Police Dragnetsfor DNA Tests Draw Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4,
2003, at A].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Glynn Wilson, In Louisiana, Debate over a DNA Dragnet, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
Feb. 21, 2003, at 3.
6. Id.
7. See POLICE PROFESSIONALISM INITIATIVE, UNIV. NEB. OMAHA, POLICE DNA "SWEEPS"
EXTREMELY UNPRODUCTIVE: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF POLICE DNA "SWEEPS" 11-12 (2004), avail-

able at www.policeaccountability.org/dnareport.pdf [hereinafter SURVEY]; Wilson, supra note 5.
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ized by police departments desperate to find answers in puzzling cases in
which DNA left on a victim may be the only evidence police have available
to solve a crime. 8 The use of these dragnets, however, has raised Fourth
Amendment concerns. The primary function of the Fourth Amendment is
to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the
government. 9 Furthermore, at the core of the Fourth Amendment is the
individual's right to be free from arbitrary intrusion by police.' 0 Accordingly, all searches, whether conducted with or without a warrant, must be
reasonable." The reasonableness of any search typically depends upon
whether the government obtained a warrant prior to the search, in accordance with the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause. 12 While there are
well-established exceptions to this rule, 13 DNA dragnets fail to fall within
8. Jonathan F. Will, Comment, DNA as Property: Implications on the Constitutionalityof DNA
Dragnets,65 U. PI'. L. REv. 129, 130 (2003); Wilson, supra note 5.
9. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
767 (1966).
10. Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
1I. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ....U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) ("It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable."
(footnote and internal quotations omitted)); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 20 (1968) ("[T]he police must,
whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant
procedure ....
" (citation omitted)); Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 ("[S]earches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." (footnotes
omitted)); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) ("When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or
government enforcement agent.").
13. The Court has upheld warrantless searches incident to arrest by police officers on the principles that such searches protect officers and prevent the destruction of evidence. Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) ("When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to
resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest
itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any
evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into
which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule."). The Court has also upheld warrantless entry into an individual's home where
police are in "hot pursuit" of a suspect. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (holding
the defendant could not thwart an otherwise proper arrest that had been set into motion in a public place
by retreating into her private residence, especially since the police needed to act quickly in order to
prevent the destruction of narcotics evidence). Consent to a search by an individual has also been
viewed by the Court to render a warrantless search reasonable as long as consent was truly voluntary.
See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439-40 (1991) (consent to a search by officers on a bus was not
coercive as long as a person would feel free to decline an officer's request or otherwise terminate an
encounter); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973) (holding that the state must show
that consent was voluntarily given to the officer to conduct a search and that "voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances," taking into account both subjective and
objective factors). In light of exigent circumstances, the Court has allowed police to conduct a search
without a warrant where probable cause exists, such as when there is a threat to public safety or an
arresting officer, or fear that there will be a destruction of evidence if the police do not act. See Cupp v.
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an established exception. 14 Although consent in the absence of probable
cause or reasonable suspicion may render a search reasonable, 15 the Supreme Court has held that the consent secured by police must be truly "voluntary" and not the product of coercion, express or implied.16 Whether the
consent was given voluntarily or was a product of coercion is determined
by the totality of the circumstances surrounding the questioning by police.17 In the case of DNA dragnets, however, consent given under coercive
conditions where police threaten individuals with court orders and media
scrutiny is not truly voluntary and thus is invalid. 18
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that in order to determine
the reasonableness of a search, a court must balance the intrusion on the
individual's privacy interests against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.19 DNA dragnet practices do not satisfy the reasonableness
balancing test in order to alleviate Fourth Amendment concerns. While the
State has a legitimate interest in solving and preventing crimes, that interest
does not outweigh individuals' interests in keeping their genetic information private. 20 Thus, because the government's interests in solving crimes
Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (upholding a forced scraping of suspect's fingernails where police
feared destruction of evidence); Terry, 392 U.S. I (upholding a limited search for weapons where
officer reasonably suspected that his and the public's safety was at issue). The Court has also adopted a
"special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement" exception to the probable cause and
warrant requirement. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619, 633-34 (1989) (citation and internal quotations omitted) (holding mandated drug and alcohol testing to be reasonable
within the Fourth Amendment where the interest in public safety outweighed the privacy concerns of
individual employees); accord Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989)
(holding suspicionless drug testing of Customs Service's employees to be reasonable where applied to
individuals involved in interdiction of illegal drugs and carrying firearms).
14. Dragnets are not conducted in light of truly voluntary consent by the individual. See discussion infra Part lI.B. DNA dragnets are not conducted where there is a risk of loss of evidence because
the DNA of an individual cannot be destroyed. See discussion infra Part II.A.2. Furthermore, dragnets
cannot qualify as a special need exception because they are conducted for ordinary law enforcement
purposes of finding a perpetrator of a crime. See discussion infra Part II.A.2. See also Jeffrey S. Grand,
Note, The Blooding ofAmerica: Privacy and the DNA Dragnet, 23 CARDOzO L. REV. 2277, 2297-2309
(2002).
15. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219 ("It is equally well settled that one of the specifically established
exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent."(citation omitted)).
16. Id. at 248.
17. Id. at 227 ("[T]he question whether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the
product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality
of all the circumstances.").
18. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438. DNA dragnet practices often have police coercion to blame for
their "consent" from individuals as police often threaten court orders, exposure to the media, or becoming a prime suspect in the crime.
19. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967).
20. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (holding that things that a person
seeks to keep private, and to which society recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy, are subject
to Fourth Amendment protections). For a discussion of why individuals' interests in keeping their
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with DNA dragnets do not outweigh individuals' interests in keeping the
personal information contained in their DNA private, the use of DNA
dragnets in the absence of probable cause and a judicial warrant cannot be
upheld as constitutional.
Part I of this Note will describe and define what the practice of DNA
dragnets entail and explore the history of this relatively new practice. Additionally, it will explain the type of information found in DNA profiles and
the potential for abuse of that information. Part II of this Note will address
the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence related to searches
and intrusions of the body, focusing on whether DNA dragnets would pass
constitutional muster. Specifically, it will argue that DNA dragnets do not
withstand constitutional scrutiny because DNA testing results in a severe
intrusion into the privacy of an individual by revealing personal medical
information. This level of intrusion is not outweighed by the need of police
departments to prevent and investigate crimes and to protect the public
where there are other means of investigating and solving crimes. In addition, DNA dragnets do not fall within any of the exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment created by the Supreme Court. Namely, consent given by
dragnetees is not voluntary but results from coercion by police; exigent
circumstances do not warrant taking a sample in the absence of a warrant
where genetic information contained in an individual's blood cannot be
altered or destroyed; and ordinary law enforcement needs do not qualify as
"special needs" allowing police to conduct these warrantless and suspicionless searches.
I.
A.

DNA DRAGNETS

Definition and Procedureof DNA Dragnets

While the facts and circumstances behind DNA dragnets vary from
case to case, many dragnet investigations harbor common characteristics. 2'
First, dragnets are typically carried out in cases in which police have recovered DNA evidence from a victim. 22 Accordingly, all of the eighteen dragnets that have occurred in the United States have involved cases of rape,

genetic information private outweighs the State's interest in solving and preventing crimes, see infra
Part I1.A.
21. Grand, supra note 14, at 2282.
22. Aaron B. Chapin, Note, Arresting DNA: Privacy Expectations of Free Citizens Versus PostConvicted Persons and the Unconstitutionalityof DNA Dragnets, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1842, 1845 (2005).
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murder, or both. 23 Second, the dragnets are carried out in cases in which
police have only a vague description of the perpetrator and thus must proceed without particularized suspicion of any individual. 24 Accordingly,
most dragnets are conducted in order to obtain samples from people who
either lived or worked near the scene of the crime, focusing on those who
might have had some opportunity to commit the crime under investigation.2 5 Third, since police lack probable cause for a warrant, DNA samples
are gathered from individuals through purportedly voluntary consent.2 6 A
person's failure to consent to a search often rouses the suspicions of the
police and leads them to focus upon an individual, which some view as the
ultimate purpose behind a dragnet. 27 Fourth, once consent is obtained from
individuals, police collect samples of usually blood or saliva to be tested
for the individuals' genetic codes, which is then compared to the DNA
28
evidence recovered from the victim.
B.

History

The first reported DNA dragnet occurred in the English village of
Narborough in 1986.29 In an attempt to solve the rape and murder of two
teenage girls from the village, police in the town sought voluntary blood
samples from 4,500 men between the ages of seventeen and thirty-four. 30
The men in the village cooperated largely because of social pressure exerted by the small community and the desire of most of the village's citizens to protect the community's young women. 3 1 The DNA samples
23. SURVEY, supra note 7, at 8; see also Chapin, supra note 22, at 1845 (finding that cases subjected to dragnets are those with DNA at the crime scene).
24. Grand, supra note 14, at 2282-83.
25. See Chapin, supra note 22, at 1845; Fred W. Drobner, DNA Dragnets: ConstitutionalAspects
of Mass DNA Identification Testing, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 479, 485 (2000); Grand, supra note 14, at
2283; see also SURVEY, supra note 7, at 9-13. The survey provides a summary of the eighteen dragnets
performed in this country and from some of the descriptions it is clear police limited dragnets to those
living or working in the area of the crimes. Whether these dragnets would perhaps work better in
smaller areas, like the village of Narborough, England, where there is a smaller number of people and
less mobility remains to be seen.
26. Chapin, supra note 22, at 1846; Drobner, supra note 25, at 503; Grand, supra note 14, at 2283.
27. Chapin, supra note 22, at 1846 ("The DNA dragnet's greatest usefulness is in stirring up
potential suspects."); Grand, supra note 14, at 2284 (suspecting the true reason why dragnets are conducted is actually for police to see who will refuse and then focus on that individual as a suspect); see
also Drobner, supra note 25, at 487 (indicating that police statements that a suspect would not become a
suspect because of his or her refusal to get tested were disingenuous, and that refusal actually leads to
pressure on individuals, which may ultimately make them incriminate themselves by getting tested).
28. Drobner, supra note 25, at 486.
29. Angus J. Dodson, DNA "Line-Ups " Based on a Reasonable Suspicion Standard, 71 U. COLO.
L. REV. 221, 223-24 (2000).
30. See Chapin, supra note 22, at 1844; Dodson, supra note 29, at 223-24.
3 1. Dodson, supranote 29, at 224.
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collected from men in the village, however, were not ultimately responsible
for the apprehension of the perpetrator of the crimes. 32 When a local man,
Colin Pitchfork, attempted to have one of his co-workers provide a DNA
sample in his place, the police's suspicions were raised, and eventually he
33
was charged with the crimes.
Since this first dragnet, the practice has become commonplace in England. 34 The results of dragnets conducted in England have been impressive
and the public far less resistant to the practice in comparison to the American public, perhaps due to its success. 35 The Forensic Science Service of
England and Wales has carried out 292 dragnets since 1995.36 Of those 292
dragnets, sixty-one, or about twenty percent of all sweeps, have produced
significant matches that have pushed investigations towards a specific individual and often led to the conviction of the individual. 37 Following England's seeming success with DNA dragnets, the practice spread to other
countries such as France and Germany. 38 Germany was the site of the largest DNA dragnet to date. 39 The German DNA dragnet occurred in 1998 and
led to the testing of nearly 16,400 people before a mechanic was found to
40
be the perpetrator of the rape and murder.
41
DNA dragnets in the United States have been far from successful.
The first dragnet to take place in the United States occurred in 1990 in San
Diego when police tested more than 800 African American men in an attempt to identify the person who stabbed six people to death in their
homes. 42 Since then, DNA dragnets have become increasingly popular in
the United States with eighteen occurring since 1990, four of which occurred in 2004.4 3 The success rate of these dragnets, however, leads their
popularity to be suspect. The only comprehensive study done on this topic
32. Chapin, supra note 22, at 1844; see also Dodson, supra note 29, at 224 (stating that a man
who did not submit a sample was eventually arrested for the crimes).
33. See Chapin, supranote 22, at 1844; Dodson, supra note 29, at 224.
34. DNA Dragnet, CBS NEWS, Sept. 12, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/09/1O/
60minutes/main642684.shtml.
35. Amanda Ripley, The DNA Dragnet,TIME, Jan. 24, 2005, at 39, 40.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Grand, supra note 14, at 2285.
39. Halbfinger, supra note 1.
40. Id.
41. See SURVEY, supra note 7, at 8 (finding only one of the eighteen dragnets performed in the
United States yielded a perpetrator of the crime under investigation).
42. Chapin, supra note 22, at 1845. Although SURVEY, supra note 7, at 9, lists the first dragnet as
occurring in 1987, the procedure used in that case, namely, that police officers tested individuals who
were already on a police suspect list, does not fit the definition of a dragnet adopted in this Note and
thus does not qualify as the first dragnet in the United States.
43. Chapin, supra note 22, at 1845.
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found that only one of the eighteen DNA dragnets performed thus far in the
United States has produced a viable suspect in the crime under investigation. 44 Ten of the eighteen cases that were investigated through the use of a
DNA dragnet were ultimately solved by other means and four remained
45
unsolved.
C.

The Nature of Information Revealed by DNA Testing

Once a police department obtains samples from suspects through a
DNA dragnet, the samples are tested to reveal the individual's DNA profile. The human genome remains substantially the same between every
individual, but within each individual's chromosomes live variations and
mutations that are unique to each individual. 4 6 By testing a sample and
isolating these areas of variations, or polymorphisms, a scientist can compare these areas of variations with the areas of variations in another sample. 47 If the two samples carry the same polymorphisms, "a scientist can
calculate the probability that the samples came from the same person,
based on how frequently those polymorphisms occur in the general popula48
tion."
While some have analogized this process to that of comparing fingerprints, this analogy neglects the complex and personal data that is revealed
by an individual's genetic profile. In the case of a fingerprint, all that is
revealed about the individual is his or her identity, not any of the individual's personal or medical information. In Davis v. Mississippi the Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of a fingerprint dragnet. 49 In investigating a rape, the police in Meridian, Mississippi, for a period of ten days,
took twenty-four African American youths to police headquarters in order
to briefly question, fingerprint, and then release them without charge. 50 The
petitioner in the case, however, was confined overnight in a Jackson jail
without a warrant or probable cause for his arrest. 5 1 The Court found that
where the police made no attempt to employ procedures to comply with the
44. The only case where a criminal suspect was identified pursuant to a DNA dragnet occurred in
Lawrence, Massachusetts. The study noted that this dragnet actually involved one of the fewest number
of persons in comparison to other DNA dragnets the study examined. The case involved the sexual
assault of a nursing home resident and thus police were able to begin with a rather short list of potential
suspects based on employment and access to the victim. SURVEY, supra note 7, at 4.
45. Id. at 8.
46. Dodson, supra note 29, at 227; Grand, supra note 14, at 2286-87.
47. Dodson, supra note 29, at 227-28.
48. Id. at 228.
49. 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).
50. Id. at 722.
51. Id. at 723.
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Fourth Amendment, fingerprints obtained from the defendant by the police
were a product of an illegal detention at police headquarters and improperly
admitted into evidence. 52 The Court, however, did leave the door open for
53
taking fingerprints from individuals without probable cause or a warrant.
The Court noted that the taking of such fingerprints could comport with the
Fourth Amendment because of the unique nature of fingerprinting that
made it much less of an intrusion upon the personal security than other
types of police searches and detentions. 54 The Court explained that
"[f]ingerprinting involves none of the probing into an individual's private
life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search. '55
In stark contrast to fingerprinting, DNA profiling probes into the private lives of individuals. DNA can be used to reveal information that is
highly personal and intimate in nature, such as an individual's behavioral
characteristics and propensity to contract certain diseases. 56 The fear
among civil libertarians is that information revealed by a DNA profile after
57
a DNA dragnet could eventually make its way to insurance companies.
Once insurance companies know an individual's propensity for a genetic
disease, the company may cancel policies. 58 This fear is exacerbated because many states have yet to regulate procedures for DNA storage and test
results after an individual has been cleared as a suspect in the crime. 5 9 Individuals who have been tested often have had to sue to try to get their
samples and DNA test results back from police departments. 60 Even more
troublesome for individuals who have been subjects of DNA dragnets is the
minimal security measures taken to keep samples and DNA profiles private
and away from the public eye. 6 1 In Oklahoma, for example, DNA samples
from a dragnet in a rape and murder investigation are kept in ordinary envelopes. 62 Thus, the dangers of the revealing and private information exposed by DNA dragnets falling into the hands of insurances companies, or
52. See id. at 728.
53. See id. at 727.
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. James F. Van Orden, DNA Databases and Discarded Private Information: "Your License,
Registration,and Intimate Bodily Details,Please," 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 343, 348-49 (2005).
57. DNA Dragnet,supra note 34.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. See id. (explaining the case of Blair Shelton, who submitted to a DNA dragnet testing and had
to sue to get his results and sample back-the suit took nearly three years); Halbfinger, supra note I
(explaining that Shannon Kohler was engaged in a similar suit to regain his sample and test results after
he was cleared as a suspect).
61. See DNA Dragnet,supra note 34.
62. Id.
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other individuals who may use the information to discriminate against
dragnetees, represents a real and imminent possibility.
II.

FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF DNA DRAGNETS

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and
63
the persons or things to be seized.
With the memory of abuses by British government agents fresh in the
minds of the Constitution's Framers, the Fourth Amendment was included
in the Constitution in an effort to guard against warrantless physical
searches of homes by agents of the government. 64 The Fourth Amendment
also reflected the common law tradition of the right and entitlement of the
individual to be left alone in his home. 65 However, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Fourth Amendment's protection to extend beyond merely an
individual's rights in his home, but also to the "inestimable right of personal security [that] belongs as much to the citizen on the streets of our
cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret
affairs."'66 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has recognized that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places."'67
The Fourth Amendment and its protections of probable cause and reasonableness are only implicated where a government action constitutes a
"search" or "seizure. '68 Should a state action not constitute a search or
seizure, the Fourth Amendment's protections do not apply, and police may

63. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
64. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760-61 (1969) (noting that the Fourth Amendment was
"in large part a reaction to general the warrants and warrantless searches that had so alienated colonists"); Nathan H. Seltzer, When History Matters Not: The Fourth Amendment in the Age of the Secret
Search, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 105, 115-19 (2004).
65. Seltzer, supra note 64, at 117.
66. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968).
67. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
68. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. A "search" within the Fourth Amendment occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361
(Harlan, J.,
concurring). A "seizure" of property within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs
"when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property."
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). "Seizure" of a person within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment occurs when there is "meaningful interference, however brief, with an individual's
freedom of movement." Id. at 113 n.5.
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proceed in the absence of particularized suspicion that the individual com69
mitted or was in involved in the commission of a crime.
With regard to intrusions into the human body, such as blood or cheek
swabs needed to conduct DNA dragnets, the Supreme Court's decision in
Schmerber v. California7 ° is instructive. In Schmerber, the defendant was
hospitalized after being involved in a car accident. 71 The police suspected
the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the accident and instructed a
physician to withdraw a blood sample from the defendant while he was
being treated at a hospital. 72 The Court held that the withdrawal of the
blood over the defendant's objection implicated the Fourth Amendment,
because "[t]he interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth
Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that
desired evidence might be obtained. '73 The Court found that "these fundamental human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate search."'74 Thus, just as
search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, the Court
found that "no less could be required where intrusions into the human body
are concerned. ' 75 Despite ultimately finding the police acted properly
given that they were confronted with an "emergency" that threatened the
destruction of evidence, 76 the Court in Schmerber reiterated that the "integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value of our society."' 77 Since
Schmerber, the Supreme Court has gone on to recognize not just compelled
intrusions into the body for blood tests but also urine analysis tests as being
78
Fourth-Amendment-protected searches.
69. Van Orden, supra note 56, at 349-50.
70. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
71. Id. at 758 & n.2.
72. Id. at 758.
73. Id. at 769-70.
74. Id. at 770.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 770-71 (explaining that the blood alcohol level in the defendant's blood would have
dissipated if the officers would have waited for a warrant from a judicial officer, and that the officers
used a reasonable and commonplace means of obtaining a sample, namely, a blood test). The Court
applied the same analysis from Schmerber to a case where the State sought to force a robbery suspect to
undergo surgery in order to remove a bullet from his chest to be used to build the case against him. See
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985). The Court found such a forced surgery would violate the suspect's Fourth Amendment rights because of the medical risks the surgery posed and the severe intrusion
the surgery posed to the suspect's privacy interests and bodily integrity. Id. at 766.
77. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772.
78. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) ("Because it is clear
that the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long
recognized as reasonable, the Federal Courts of Appeals have concluded unanimously, and we agree,
that these intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment."); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989).
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Accordingly, because DNA dragnets may require blood tests and because the Court has already specifically addressed the taking of blood tests
by police officers, dragnets conducted with blood tests would qualify as
searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Saliva testing
would also likely qualify as a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, because it too involves intrusions into the body in order to
obtain a sample of bodily fluids. Like urine analysis, the procurement of a
saliva sample does not entail a surgical intrusion into the body. The Supreme Court has nonetheless held that intrusions such as urine tests constitute a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment because of the
potential for analysis of such a sample to "reveal a host of private medical
facts" about an individual. 79 Thus, both methods of conducting a DNA
dragnet, procuring a sample of blood or saliva, would qualify as searches
under the Fourth Amendment.
Although a governmental action may implicate a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, that search may withstand constitutional scrutiny if it is "reasonable. ' 80 The Fourth Amendment prohibits
searches from being unreasonable, but it fails to define precisely what conditions render a search reasonable. The reasonableness of a given search or
seizure depends upon balancing legitimate governmental interests against
the individual's right to privacy and personal security free from arbitrary
interference by law officers. 81 In most instances the Supreme Court has
relied on the fulfillment of the Warrant Clause to render a search reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 82 At the very least, in
the absence of a warrant, a search must ordinarily be based upon an individual suspicion of wrongdoing in order to be found reasonable. 83
79. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
80. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768 ("[T]he Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not
against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or
which are made in an improper manner.").
81. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,
299-300 (1999); see also Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) ("[T]here can be no
ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.").
82. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 20 (1968) ("We do not retreat from our holdings that the police
must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the
warrant procedure .... (citations omitted)); see also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)
("When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a
judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.").
83. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) ("A search or seizure is ordinarily
unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing." (citation omitted)); Chandler
v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997) ("The Fourth Amendment requires government to respect 'ft]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons... against unreasonable searches and seizures.' This
restraint on government conduct generally bars officials from undertaking a search or seizure absent
individualized suspicion." (quoting Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668) (alteration in original)).
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"[B]ecause the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness,' 84 the Supreme Court has also recognized limited and welldelineated exceptions to the requirement of a warrant and, in certain cases,
even the requirement of probable cause in order for a search to be reasonable. 85 DNA dragnets, however, remain outside the constitutionality of the
Fourth Amendment because they are conducted in the absence of a warrant,
lack probable cause, and fail to fall within recognized exceptions to the
requirement of a warrant or probable cause, such as voluntary consent,
exigent circumstances, or "special needs"; thus DNA dragnets fail to satisfy
the reasonableness balancing test.
A.

ReasonablenessAnalysis

Although the determination that a search is reasonable is usually a result of the fulfillment of the Warrant Clause, in the absence of a warrant, a
search may still be found to be reasonable and thus constitutional. 86 In
order to determine the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth
Amendment, the degree to which the search imposes upon the individual's
expectation of privacy is weighed against the government's need for the
search in order to promote a legitimate interest. 87 In the case of DNA dragnets, the individual's expectation of privacy lies in his interest to keep the
information contained in his DNA out of the hands of the public. On the
other hand, the government's interest is in finding potential rapists and
murderers. While law enforcement interests are undoubtedly important, the
Constitution does not afford police whatever means it likes in meeting
these interests. 88 The Fourth Amendment's emphasis on protecting the
privacy and dignity of the individual cannot allow police to test individuals' blood or saliva to reveal important and private DNA information without probable cause and a warrant.
1. Individual Expectation of Privacy in Information Contained in DNA
Whether a search conducted by police constitutes an unreasonable action by law enforcement under the Fourth Amendment depends upon the
intrusion the search imposes upon the individual subject to the search. 89
84. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 126 S.Ct 1943, 1947 (2006).
85. See supra note 13.
86. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
87. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35.
88. See id. at 528 ("The basic purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in countless
decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.").
89. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985).

2007]

SEARCHING FOR A NEEDLE INA HA YSTACK

This personal intrusion, however, is not merely limited to the impact of the
intrusion at the time the sample is extracted from the individual. 9 0 Rather,
the personal intrusion resulting from DNA dragnets that violates the Fourth
Amendment lies not with the means by which a sample is taken, often the
rather noninvasive buccal swab, but with the personal information found
within the sample once it has been tested by law enforcement authorities.
The DNA identification process has frequently been referred to as "DNA
fingerprinting," but such a title overlooks the more-than-superficial information that is revealed by DNA profiling. While the Supreme Court in
Davis v. Mississippi noted that "[flingerprinting involves none of the probing into an individual's private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation
or search,"91 it is clear that DNA profiling does include probing into the
92
personal life of the individual.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the intrusion that
DNA testing involves, other state and federal courts addressing the issue
have failed to consider not just the intrusion that results from the procedure
used to obtain a sample, but also the intrusion upon the individual's interest
in keeping private the information revealed by a sample. For example,
when the Ninth Circuit applied the reasonableness balancing test to determine whether requiring federal offenders to have their DNA tested without
a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment, the court did not consider the
intrusion DNA testing poses upon individuals' interests in keeping the information within their DNA private. 93 Instead, the court merely considered
the intrusion posed by the procedure of withdrawing a DNA sample from
an individual. 94 Thus, the court explained the intrusion "is not significant,
since such tests are commonplace in these days of periodic physical examinations and experience with them teaches that the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and that for most people the procedure involves
virtually no risk, trauma, or pain."'95 The court at no point considered the
individual's expectation of privacy in the host of information that could be
revealed through DNA testing. 96 Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in State v. Raines considered whether a statute requiring the collection
of DNA samples from certain convicted persons violated the Fourth
90. See Chapin, supra note 22, at 1859.
91. 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).
92. See discussion supra Part I.C.
93. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 836-38 (9th Cir. 2004) (court considered only the
potential for the improper use of the information but not the individual suspect's interest in keeping
person health and genetic information private from even law enforcement officers).
94. See id.
95. Id. at 836 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
96. See id. at 836-38.
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Amendment. 97 Again the court concluded that the state's compelling interest in collecting DNA from convicted individuals outweighed the minor
physical intrusion imposed by DNA testing through buccal swabbing or
blood sampling. 98 The Maryland Court of Appeals, like the Ninth Circuit,
never considered the intrusion posed by the subsequent testing of a DNA
sample and the information that testing reveals.
Thus, what both the Maryland court and Ninth Circuit failed to consider, however, is the individual's privacy interest in the identifying information contained in the saliva or blood sample taken. As the Supreme
Court has recognized, the privacy interests at issue in an individual's biological samples include the "host of private medical facts about an [individual]" that may be revealed by testing of the sample, and are not merely
limited to whether or not the procedure used to procure a sample is invasive. 9 9 As the District Court for the Eastern District of New York properly
recognized, "[a] saliva sample can provide a significant amount of genetic
identity information and it is generally not an item in the public domain."10 0 The host of medical and biological information contained within
a DNA sample represents information that individuals typically seek to
keep from the public sphere and thus should be protected under the Fourth
Amendment by requiring warrants or a showing of probable cause to obtain
it. DNA, unlike a fingerprint, does not merely contain a record of an individual's identity but vast amounts of personal information including physical health and behavioral characteristics, among others.10' According to the
Human Genome Project, "DNA can provide insights into many intimate
aspects of a person and their families including susceptibility to particular
diseases, legitimacy of birth, and perhaps predispositions to certain behaviors and sexual orientation." 102 The nature of the information DNA provides "increases the potential for genetic discrimination by government,
insurers, employers, schools, banks, and others." 10 3
Furthermore, many states do not require police departments to destroy
samples or return them to their owners even if a person is not found to be a
suspect in the crime under investigation.104 Thus, police departments can
97. 857 A.2d 19, 20-21 (Md. 2004).
98. See id.
at 29.
99. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617.
100. United States v. Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. 50, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
101. Van Orden, supra note 56, at 348.
102. Human Genome Project, DNA Forensics, http://www.om1.gov/sci/techresources/
man_Genome/elsi/forensics.shtml (last visited July 5, 2006).
103. Id.
104. See DNA Dragnet, supra note 34; see also Chapin, supra note 22, at 1860.
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lawfully keep databases of those individuals tested during a DNA dragnet. 105 As one scholar has noted, "Since police departments routinely
search these private databases, the intrusion upon the dragnetee is arguably
106
repeated more times than the initial intrusion upon bodily integrity."'
Additionally, with the mapping of the human genome underway and increasing knowledge of DNA analysis, biological samples "voluntarily"
submitted during a dragnet may be tested in the future to reveal more inti07
mate details about an individual's biological and behavioral makeup.'
The highly personal information revealed by general genetic testing and
any future testing could be accessed not only by law enforcement agencies,
but also "other government agencies and even private corporations, such as
health-care providers and insurers." 10 8
Disclosure to other agencies and corporations represents a real privacy
concern for individuals subjected to DNA dragnets because of the lack of
security measures taken to protect DNA samples and profiles. 109 Police
departments take few, if any, security measures to keep samples and DNA
profiles private and away from the public eye." 0 Many states lack statutes
informing police what to do with DNA after an individual has been cleared
of the charges and, as a result, take a less-than-vigilant approach to protecting samples from becoming public. IIIEven if statutes were to place limitations upon the dissemination of DNA profiles, "the risk of disclosure
cannot be discounted." 1 2 Thus, the severe intrusion upon the privacy interests of an individual through genetic testing and profiling occurs not just
once but may, in fact, occur repeatedly exposing both an individual's intimate physical and behavioral details to the public.
The importance of keeping personal medical information private has
been recognized as a legitimate privacy interest by the Supreme Court."l 3
In Whalen v. Roe, the Court considered the constitutionality of a New York
105. Chapin, supra note 22, at 1860.
106. Id.
107. Grand, supra note 14, at 2288.
108. Id. at 2289.
109. See DNA Dragnet,supra note 34.
110. See id. (stating that DNA samples from a dragnet conducted in a rape and murder case are kept
in envelopes in the crime lab).
11. See id.
112. Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth Amendment,
74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 96 (1995).
113. See Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977) (reaffirming that one element of
privacy includes the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters); Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (recognizing for the first time that privacy includes two interests: the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters and the individual interest in making certain
important decisions independently).
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statute requiring that a physician provide the state with a copy of every
prescription for certain drugs."l 4 The copy of the prescription provided to
the state not only the name of the drug prescribed but also the name, address, and age of the patient. 115 In considering whether the statute at issue
violated the Constitution, the Court recognized that protecting an individual's privacy involves at least two different interests.116 One interest the
Court recognized was the right of the individual to make important decisions, such as those related to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
117
relationships, and child rearing, free from governmental intervention.
The second interest in privacy the Court recognized was "the individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters." 1 8 While the Whalen
Court upheld the New York statute because of the procedural safeguards it
contained against public disclosure of information, the Court recognized
the danger in the government requiring the collection and storage of personal information.'1 9 The Court pointed out that public disclosure could be
potentially embarrassing and harmful and left open the question of whether
disclosure of personal information by a system that did not contain security
measures comparable to those in the New York statute would violate an
20
individual's privacy interests. 1
Thus, as the Supreme Court has recognized in Whalen, an individual's
privacy interests under the Constitution includes the right to keep personal
medical information out of the public forum. The Court also recognized
that absent procedural safeguards, as is the case of DNA dragnets today, an
individual may have their privacy interests violated through public disclosure of medical information either intentionally or unintentionally. Given
the "host of medical facts" revealed through DNA analysis, the complete
lack of safeguards, and rather informal security measures taken by law
enforcement to protect the samples of DNA, this potential to violate an
individual's privacy interests is great.
Accordingly, while it is true that obtaining DNA samples does not
represent an undue burden or hardship upon an individual's expectation of
privacy, the information revealed through the testing of those samples and
the potential disclosure of that personal information does impermissibly
burden an individual's expectation of privacy. The intrusion posed by the
l14.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

429 U.S. at 593.
Id.
See id.
at599-600.
See id. at 599-600 & n.26.
Id.at599.
See id.
at605-06.
See id.
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information revealed through DNA testing, not merely the means of obtaining the sample, constitutes the unconstitutional action by the state. The
intrusion does not end after a sample is taken. Rather, the intrusion begins
with the procurement of the DNA sample from the individual.
2.

Government Interest in Conducting DNA Dragnets

There thus exists a strong interest in keeping personal medical and behavioral information found within DNA private either for personal reasons
or to prevent discrimination in society. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
however, has never held an individual's interest in privacy to be absolute
but has weighed it against the governmental interest furthered by a particular practice at issue. 12 1 The government interests served by DNA dragnets
typically cited include legitimate interests in "creating records for identification, in preventing criminal activity, in solving past and future crimes,
and the advancement of criminal law enforcement."'] 22 These governmental
interests served by DNA dragnets, however, pale in comparison to an individual's interest in privacy when one considers that an individual's DNA is
indestructible and unalterable, free citizens are targeted by these dragnets,
and law enforcement pursue only ordinary law enforcement interests
through DNA dragnets.
Because the information revealed by a DNA test in a dragnet is genetic in nature and not subject to change, a search warrant should be obtained by law enforcement in order to procure a sample. In Schmerber v.
California,the Supreme Court considered whether a search consisting of a
nonconsensual withdrawal of blood done without a warrant comported with
the Fourth Amendment where the individual had been arrested for drunk
driving. 12 3 The Court found the search to be constitutional and, in reaching
its decision, considered the officer's belief that if he did not act, the evidence of the defendant's intoxication would be destroyed, as the percentage
124
of alcohol would begin to diminish shortly after the drinking stopped.
Thus, if the officer had attempted to obtain a search warrant, the defendant's blood alcohol content when the sample was eventually taken may
not have been above the legal limit and no evidence of his intoxication
would have been secured. 125 Additionally, in Cupp v. Murphy, the Supreme
121. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,654 (1979).
122. Laurie Strourn Yeshulas, DNA Dragnet Practices: Are They Constitutional?, 8 SUFFOLK J.
TRIAL & APP. ADV. 133, 155 (2003); see also People v. King, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220, 226-28 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2000).
123. 384 U.S. 757, 758-59 (1966).
124. See id. at 770-71.
125. See id.
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Court considered a case where the respondent had not been arrested or been
subject to a warrant when the police took a sample of scrapings from his
nails without consent. 126 Following the murder of his wife, the respondent
had come into the police department with a dark spot appearing to be blood
under his fingernail. 12 7 The Court upheld the search of the respondent because it found that probable cause existed and the ready destructibility of
the evidence again justified the police officer's actions. 12 8
The genetic information found within an individual's blood, however,
is not the sort of evidence that was found in Schmerber or Cupp. Unlike
those cases, an individual's genetic information cannot be altered or destroyed if police fail to act in a timely manner. 12 9 Furthermore, unlike in
Schmerber and Cupp, even if DNA were of an ephemeral nature, the taking
of a DNA sample in a dragnet would still be unwarranted because dragnets
are conducted in the absence of probable cause. 130 Thus, as the Supreme
Court has noted,
The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth
Amendment protects forbid [bodily] intrusions on the mere chance
that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear
indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that
such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate
search. 131
In addition, the argument that individuals may pose flight risks does not
justify obtaining samples of their DNA in the absence of a warrant under
the exigent circumstances exception. If authorities have enough probable
cause to believe an individual may pose a flight risk, they likely have
enough probable cause to obtain a warrant or arrest the individual and
should pursue those avenues in order to obtain a sample. 132 Accordingly,
police do not have a strong interest in obtaining DNA samples without a
warrant where such evidence cannot be destroyed. Officers can conduct
more thorough and targeted investigations to establish probable cause and
then obtain a warrant to get a DNA sample from an individual. After all, an
individual's DNA will not be destroyed or go anywhere in the meanwhile.

126. 412 U.S. 291, 292 (1973).
127. Id.
128. See id. at 296.
129. See People v. Marshall, 244 N.W.2d 451, 457 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) ("Because blood type is
genetic in nature and not subject to change, it would seem a search warrant must be obtained." (footnote
omitted)).
130. See discussion supra Part L.A.
131. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966).
132. Drobner, supra note 25, at 503.
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In addition, when other courts in the country have upheld the procurement of genetic information in the absence of a warrant or probable
cause, they have done so because the individual was a convicted felon and,
unlike free citizens subjected to DNA dragnets, had a diminished expectation of privacy that could not outweigh the strong governmental interest at
issue. In Rise v. Oregon, for example, the Ninth Circuit upheld an Oregon
statute requiring felons convicted of murder or specific sexual offenses to
submit a blood sample for a DNA databank. 133 The court noted that the
statute did not violate the Fourth Amendment because felons "do not have
the same expectations of privacy in their identifying genetic information
that 'free persons' have."'1 34 The court explained that felons had diminished
expectations of privacy, because once an individual has been convicted of a
crime, "his identity has become a matter of state interest and he has lost any
legitimate expectation of privacy in the identifying information derived
from the blood sampling."' 135 The court then weighed this diminished expectation of privacy against the important government interest at issue,
namely, strong evidence of high rates of recidivism among certain types of
murderers and sexual offenders and findings that often their crimes were
more likely to yield the type of evidence that could be run through a DNA
database.1 36 Thus, the court concluded that the DNA databank "advance[d]
the overwhelming public interest in prosecuting crimes accurately."' 137 The
Fourth and Tenth Circuits have also recognized the distinction between
gathering DNA evidence from free persons and obtaining the DNA of convicted felons whose identities are a matter of legitimate state interest and
138
who have reduced expectations of privacy due to their convictions.
Thus, where DNA sampling in the absence of a warrant or probable
cause has been upheld by courts, there has been an undeniable governmental interest at issue that could not be outweighed by the rather weak and
diminished privacy interests of the individual. The case of DNA dragnets,
however, is the exact opposite. Individuals subject to a dragnet have strong
privacy interests in keeping their personal and behavioral information contained within their DNA private, and this interest has not been diminished
133. 59 F.3d 1556, 1564 (9th Cir. 1995).
134. Id. at 1560.
135. Id.
136. See id.
at1561.
137. Id. (emphasis omitted).
138. See Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1339-40 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding a Colorado statute
requiring inmates convicted of an offense involving sexual assault to provide state with DNA samples
before release to parole was not violative of the Fourth Amendment); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302,
310-11 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding Virginia legislation requiring the Department of Corrections to take and
store blood of convicted felons for later DNA analysis did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
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in any way by the commission of a crime. 139 The governmental interest at
issue, namely, solving and deterring crimes, while important, is not important or compelling enough to outweigh this undiminished expectation of
privacy; given that individuals subject to DNA dragnets retain their full
rights, only an immensely important governmental interest could outweigh
their privacy interests.
Cases involving involuntarily sampling from felons for DNA databases do indeed serve strong governmental interests, because, as the Ninth
Circuit noted, there exists "uncontroverted evidence documenting the high
rates of recidivism among certain types of murderers and sexual offenders." 140 Thus, states have an undeniable interest in maintaining DNA databanks, because they have evidence that will in fact help meet governmental
objectives of preventing or solving crimes. This strong, proven governmental interest weighs heavily against the rather diminished and weak expectations of privacy convicted felons possess.
DNA dragnets, however, cannot be characterized by evidence of their
usefulness in solving crimes and thus meeting governmental objectives in
solving crimes. Rather, dragnets act as a needle-in-a-haystack approach by
police to hopefully find a perpetrator of a crime and, given their inefficiency, the governmental interest in them appears to be rather weak. The
only comprehensive study conducted of DNA dragnet practices in the
United States found that a dragnet was successful in producing a suspected
offender in only one of eighteen cases examined. 14 1 Even in that one successful case, the police department had begun with a short list of individuals to test because the sexual assault victim had come into contact with a
very limited number of individuals. 142 Furthermore, in a time when many
cities and states face budget concerns, the testing of sometimes thousands
43
of individuals places even greater burdens on already strained budgets. 1
Additionally, massive round-ups of hundreds or thousands of individuals "may actually hinder criminal investigations by increasing the
backlog of work at the state crime lab."' 144 For example, in the Massachusetts investigation of the murder of Christa Worthington, a DNA sample of
an individual was found to be a match to DNA recovered from Worthing139. See supra Part II.A.I.
140. Rise, 59 F.3dat 1561.
141. SuRVEY, supranote 7, at 4.
142. See id.
143. See Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of Massachusetts Warns that Random DNA Dragnets
Hinder, Not Help, Crime Investigations, Apr. 15, 2005 [hereinafter ACLU], http://www.aclu.org/
privacy/medical/15323prs20050415.html (mentioning the "wasteful" nature of DNA dragnets).
144. Id.
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ton's body. 145 The police in the case had been in possession of the sample
for more than a year but had not tested it because of the huge backlog created by a DNA dragnet the police department had conducted. 14 6 In addition, the matching sample had not even been procured from the dragnet but
had been obtained as a result of information that led to a more focused
investigation. 14 7 Thus, even if DNA dragnets were found to be constitutional, more focused police investigations would help solve crimes more
efficiently both in terms of time and money. 14 8 Thus, the governmental
interest in solving or preventing crimes through DNA dragnets, unlike in
the case of collecting DNA samples from felons, is not strong where DNA
dragnets' record of actually meeting those interests is so weak, especially
given that there is such a strong interest in privacy asserted by free citizens
subject to these searches.
In addition, the "special needs" doctrine that typically has acted to justify warrantless and suspicionless searches due to a strong governmental
issue at stake is inapplicable to DNA dragnets. Where DNA dragnets serve
primarily to further law enforcement purposes, they cannot be considered
as serving a special need warranting exception to the requirement of probable cause under the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court has found that a search unsupported by probable cause can be
considered constitutional "when special needs, beyond the normal need of
law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.' ' 14 9 For example, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass 'n and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, the Court
upheld the warrantless and suspicionless alcohol and drug testing of employees. 150 In Skinner, the Court pointed to the need of the government to
assure the safety of individuals riding trains by ensuring railway employees
were not operating trains in an impaired manner as a significant governmental interest strong enough to overcome the privacy interests of employees.151 Similarly, in Von Raab, the Court upheld the drug testing program
of the United States Customs Service because of its strong interest in assuring personnel were physically fit and not subject to any impairments given

145. Id.
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. See SURVEY, supra note 7, at 9-13 (including up to eighteen examples of the inefficiency of
past DNA dragnets in solving crimes); ACLU, supra note 143.
149. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
150. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620-24 (1989); Nat'l Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670-72 (1989).
151. See489 U.S. at 620-24.
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that many carried fire arms and had impeachable integrity and judgment
152
needed in the war on drugs.
Where the purpose to be served by a warrantless and suspicionless
search, however, has been ordinary law enforcement needs, the Court has
been unwilling to extend the special needs exception. In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Court refused to uphold checkpoints set up by police in
order to interdict unlawful drugs, because the checkpoint's primary purpose
could not be distinguished from the general interest in crime control. 153 The
Court explained that it was "particularly reluctant to recognize exceptions
to the general rule of individualized suspicion where governmental authorities primarily pursue their general crime control ends."' 154 The Court did
recognize that law enforcement could in fact set up checkpoints in the
event of certain emergencies or exigencies, like a terrorist attack, but not in
situations like the one before it where "authorities might simply stop cars
as a matter of course to see if there just happens to be a felon leaving the
55
jurisdiction."1
DNA dragnets, however, closely resemble the needle-in-the-haystack
approach the Court repudiated in Edmond, and thus it appears they cannot
qualify under a special needs exception. Like the actions of the police in
Edmond where individuals were stopped in the hopes of finding a felon,
individuals in DNA dragnets are subjected to DNA testing in the hopes of
finding a genetic match in a criminal investigation. Furthermore, DNA
dragnets merely serve the same sort of general interest in crime control as
the roadblock that the Court found unconstitutional in Edmond. The sole
purpose of a DNA dragnet, like the roadblock at issue in Edmond, is to
apprehend a criminal.156 Thus, the general interest in crime control served
by DNA dragnets is not strong enough to outweigh the even stronger interest of free persons to be free from forced DNA testing and to keep their
genetic information private. 157
152. See 489 U.S. at 670.
153. 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
154. Id. at43.
155. Id. at 44.
156. Grand, supra note 14, at 2302.
157. One scholar has noted that two circuit courts appear to have endorsed DNA databanks as
serving interests beyond mere law enforcement. See Chapin, supra note 22, at 1866. The scholar further
notes that although the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Kimler recognized that the government could
assert a strong governmental interest beyond ordinary law enforcement needs under the special needs
exception in creating a DNA databank, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003), that court appeared to be
referring to only imprisoned or formerly imprisoned individuals. See Chapin, supra note 22, at 1866. In
fact, the Seventh Circuit in Green v. Berge, noted that the Tenth Circuit in Kimler appeared to balance
the governmental interest at issue against the diminished privacy interests of prisoners rather than free
persons. See 354 F.3d 675, 677 (7th Cir. 2004).
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Therefore, although the government does indeed possess an important
interest in solving and preventing crimes, that interest, like an individual's
interest in privacy, is not absolute. In the case of DNA dragnets where free
persons are forced to give evidence that has no chance of being destroyed
and where police pursue only ordinary law enforcement interests, the interests of the individual must trump the interests of the government.
B.

DNA DragnetsDo Not Involve Voluntary Consentfrom Individuals

Consent to a search relieves authorities of both the need to obtain a
warrant and probable cause. 158 Accordingly, voluntary consent appears to
offer a means of rendering DNA dragnets constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment. However, thorough examination of the circumstances under
which DNA dragnets are conducted shows that significant barriers prevent
the consent garnered from individuals from being considered truly voluntary.
1. Determining the Voluntariness of Consent to a Search
The Supreme Court has recognized that searches conducted with the
consent of the individual are constitutional even in the absence of a warrant
or probable cause. 159 The touchstone for determining if consent renders a
search constitutional is whether or not the consent given by the individual
was "freely and voluntarily given."' 160 Voluntary consent absent coercion,
no matter how subtly applied, is required because absent truly voluntary
consent, "the resulting 'consent' would be no more than a pretext for the
unjustified police intrusion against which the Fourth Amendment is directed.' 16 1 Whether a search resulted from truly voluntary consent or was
"the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact
to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances" surrounding the
"consent." 1 62
The Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte likened the test used
to determine the voluntariness of a confession to that of determining the
158. See Florida v. Jimeo, 500 U.S. 248, 250-51 (1991) ("[W]e have long approved consensual
searches because it is no doubt reasonable for the police to conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so.").
159. See id.
160. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) ("[T]he Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that [the State] demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not
the result of duress or coercion, express or implied."); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548
(1968).
161. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228.
162. Id. at 227.
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voluntariness of a search. 163 The Court noted that its earlier cases in determining the voluntary nature of confessions had looked to the "totality of all
the surrounding circumstances," '1 64 which included examining subjective
factors "regarding the characteristics of the accused" and objective factors
"regarding the conduct of the police and the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation."' 165 Accordingly, some of the factors the Court found may be
considered in determining the voluntariness of a search included whether
the subject of the search had knowledge of a right to refuse, the age of the
accused, the educational level of the accused, where a police encounter
takes place, and whether threats or physical punishment were used to in166
duce consent.
For example, in United States v. Mendenhall, the Supreme Court, in a
plurality opinion, first analyzed the subjective factors of the accused in
determining whether the consent given by the defendant was voluntary; the
Court noted the defendant was twenty-two years old, had an eleventh grade
education, and was thus plainly capable of knowing consent. 167 The Court
also went on to note the objective factors surrounding the defendant's consent, such as that she was expressly informed twice that she could refuse
consent to the search and still consented to the search, pointed to finding
that consent had been voluntarily given. 168 Similarly, in United States v.
Watson, the Court considered both subjective and objective factors in finding that the defendant in question had given valid voluntary consent to a
search. 169 The Court considered subjective factors about the defendant,
such as the fact that there was no evidence that the defendant was a "newcomer to the law, mentally deficient, or unable in the face of a custodial
arrest to exercise free choice."' 70 The Court also looked to objective factors
surrounding consent, such as the fact that the defendant consented on a
public street rather than in the confines of a police station, there was no
evidence of overt act or threat of force against the defendant, and there
were no indications of any promises made to him in order to influence his
71
consent.

163. See id. at 226-27.
164. Id. at 226.
165. Ric Simmons, Not "Voluntary" But Still Reasonable:A New Paradigmfor Understandingthe
Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 778 (2005) (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226).
166. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 247, 249.
167. See 446 U.S. 544, 558 (1980) (plurality).
168. See id.

169. See423 U.S. 411, 424-25 (1976).
170. Id.
171. See id. at 424.
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Furthermore, more recently in Florida v. Bostick, the Supreme Court
noted that "'[c]onsent' that is the product of official intimidation or harassment is not consent at all."' 172 In Bostick, the Court held that where a
defendant was asked for consent to search his luggage while on a bus, the
proper test in determining whether the officer's request for a search was
coercive was "whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the
officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter."' 173 The Court explained in Bostick that its formulation of the inquiry into the voluntary nature of the search was in accordance with its previous cases that took into
account all the circumstances surrounding the encounter. 174 Thus, the Supreme Court has found that where a consenting party claims duress or coercion, the court must consider both the party's subjective state of mind and
75
whether an objectively reasonable person would feel coerced.1
2.

Assessing the Voluntariness of Consent in DNA Dragnets

The consent obtained by officers in DNA dragnets does not qualify as
voluntary due to the coercive actions of police. Examination of the methods
used by police to obtain consent reveals that many individuals subjected to
testing of their DNA in police dragnets hardly feel their consent is given
voluntarily. A participant in a mass DNA dragnet that occurred in Ann
Arbor, Michigan, in 1995 stated that he was told he would "have to" to
submit a DNA sample.176 That same participant was informed that should
he choose to refuse to cooperate with the police, the police would "go upstairs and get a court order." 177 Similarly, in a DNA dragnet conducted in
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Shannon Kohler was told by police that if he refused to voluntarily consent to giving a DNA sample, they would obtain a
court order to get such a sample. 178 In the same dragnet conducted in Baton
Rouge, Floyd Wagster Jr. was subjected to similar threats by police. 179
Wagster was told by the police that should he refuse to "voluntarily" give a
sample of his DNA, "We're gonna go get a court order to get it from you.
How you [sic] want to handle that? You want the court order? Fine with
me. I'll light your ass up on the ... news, too."' 180
172. 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991).
173. Id.at 436.
174. See id. at 436-37.
175. See Grand supra note 14, at 2303-04 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 24849 (1973)).
176. Drobner, supra note 25, at 505 (internal quotations omitted).
177. Id. at 506 (internal quotations omitted).
178. Halbfinger, supra note 1.
179. See Mark Hansen, DNA Dragnet,90 ABA J. 38,40 (2004).
180. Id.
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Such appeals to unfounded legal authority violate the Supreme Court's
holding in Bumper v. North Carolina.18 1 In Bumper, the defendant's
grandmother only consented to the police searching the premises after being told that the police had obtained a search warrant to do so when, in fact,
the police had no such warrant. 182 The Court explained that "[w]hen a law
enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant, he
announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search. The
183
situation is instinct with coercion-albeit colorably lawful coercion."
Thus, the Court held that "[w]here there is coercion there cannot be consent." 184 Accordingly, the defendant's grandmother could not have voluntarily consented to the search where she was subject to coercion, because
she believed there to be a valid search warrant mandating that she allow the
officers into the home. 185 Similarly, statements by police that they will
obtain samples of DNA through a court order that does not yet exist is an
appeal to lawful authority that would void any consent.
The coercive settings of DNA dragnets also indicate that the consent
by individuals cannot be voluntary and thus valid under the Fourth
Amendment. As the Supreme Court indicated in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the subjective state of mind of the individual being interviewed is a
factor in assessing whether consent that is given by the individual is the
product of coercion. 186 Individuals refusing to submit to DNA sampling in
high profile cases have been subject to media scrutiny. 187 Fear of media
scrutiny has induced individuals to cooperate with police the first time they
are asked for a DNA sample rather than being subjected to a search warrant
and a great deal of public embarrassment. 188 Police in at least one DNA
dragnet have used the fear of media attention and public speculation as
leverage in order to force individuals to give DNA samples. 189 Furthermore, the police station setting where participants in DNA dragnets are
asked for their DNA samples also serves as a coercive environment. The
181. See 391 U.S. 543 (1968); see also Drobner, supra note 25, at 506 (stating that police threats to
obtain a court order if an individual would not submit a DNA sample may "run afoul" of Bumper).
182. 391 U.S. at 546.
183. Id. at 550.
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. See 412 U.S. 218, 249 (1973).
187. See Halbfinger, supra note I (describing the case of Shannon Kohler whose refusal to submit
to a sample led to police threats of putting his name in the media as a suspected rapis' and whose name
was ultimately leaked from court documents to the media).
188. See DNA Dragnets: The Uses and Abuses of Genetic Information, 8 NEW ATLANTIS 104, 105
at
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/archive/8/soa/TNA08-StateoftheArtavailable
(2005),
DNADragnets.pdf.
189. See Halbfinger, supra note I.
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police station setting forces individuals to be surrounded by uniformed
officers displaying indicia of authority and subjected to physical isolation,
which may cause an individual to feel as though he cannot refuse a request
to a search. 190 Individuals in at least one DNA dragnet reported feeling
bullied by the police into submitting DNA samples and being treated as
criminals in police stations by being fingerprinted, photographed, and isolated prior to signing a form to consent to the test. 191
Additionally, individuals may not feel that they can refuse a request
for a DNA sample, because they may fear even greater police scrutiny that
may be generated by a refusal to submit a DNA sample. An individual
refusing to cooperate with police in a dragnet often creates a lead for police
to follow. 192 An individual may choose to simply submit to the testing
when asked the first time rather than deal with the police repeatedly as they
continue to investigate. Individuals are effectively told by police to consent
or have a criminal investigation turn their lives upside down.
Even where consent is elicited at the homes of individuals, cultural attitudes towards police may play into whether an individual subjectively
feels he has a real choice to consent to the testing. In studies, African
Americans have been found to view the justice system as unfair while
whites believe the opposite. 193 These beliefs influence how individuals of
different races interpret events. 194 As a result of their distrust in the fairness
of the justice system, African Americans are much more suspicious of police, and these suspicions inform the way in which they view encounters
with police. 195 Accordingly, to individuals in areas like England where
violent crime has a fairly low incidence and the culture is more homogeneous, a police officer's request to aid in an investigation may be viewed by
196
an individual to be less coercive and more a plea for help from police.
Where individuals feel police act upon racial motivations and have a tenuous relationship with police, however, they will likely feel that they do not
have a real choice in whether to cooperate with police. Thus, even where a
request for a DNA sample occurs on neutral territory or the territory of the
individual, cultural attitudes towards police may cause an individual to
view the "request" by a police officer as a thinly veiled demand.
190. Drobner, supra note 25, at 505.
191. See id.; see also Halbfinger, supra note 1.
192. See DNA Dragnet,supra note 34.
193. See, e.g., Jon Hurwitz & Mark Peffley, Explaining the Great Racial Divide: Perceptions of
Fairnessin the U.S. CriminalJustice System, 67 J. POL. 762, 769 (2005).
194. Id. at 778-79.
195. Id.
196. Drobner, supra note 25, at 506.
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According to the analysis above, both subjective and objective factors
warn against the ability of individuals subject to DNA dragnets to give
truly voluntary consent to searches. Without consent abrogating the need
for a warrant or probable cause, it appears that in order for DNA dragnets
to withstand constitutional scrutiny, they must satisfy the reasonableness
balancing test. DNA dragnets, as discussed above, however, are incapable
of satisfying the reasonableness balancing test in the absence of a warrant
or probable cause. Thus, the practice of DNA dragnets must be conducted
pursuant to a warrant and probable cause to avoid running afoul of the
Fourth Amendment.
CONCLUSION

The Fourth Amendment was included in the Constitution by the
Framers because the abuses they had suffered at the hands of the British
government were all too fresh in their minds. As the Supreme Court has
noted, the Fourth Amendment "was in large part a reaction to the general
warrants and warrantless searches that had so alienated the colonists and
had helped speed the movement for independence."' 97 What the Framers
feared and tried to guard against has unfortunately come to fruition. Although DNA dragnets are not the same as the warrantless searches suffered
by the colonists, the principle underlying both types of searches is the
same. Law enforcement officials use tactics of intimidation to secure acquiescence from individuals who feel they have no other choice but to
submit to what is being asked of them. Admittedly, law enforcement officials have an interest and a duty to solve crimes, but this duty must be balanced against the right of the individual to be free from arbitrary and
intrusive actions by police.
There is great appeal to the idea that police may be able to conclusively solve a crime by simply finding a DNA match between a victim and
the people who may have come in contact with the victim. The reality,
however, is that this process has been far from successful and has destroyed
people's lives and livelihoods while trampling upon the protections the
Fourth Amendment sought to secure. Shannon Kohler gave his DNA sample to police, and even after cooperating with police, paid the price of having his name revealed in public court documents in what the police called
"a good-faith clerical mistake."' 198 Within hours there was a local television

197. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 761, 761 (1969).
198. Halbfinger, supra note 1.
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reporter at his door. 199 Kohler's DNA eventually cleared his name but the
price paid was that his Fourth Amendment rights were ignored by the police, he was subjected to media speculation of being a killer, and he still has
200
not been able to secure the return of his DNA sample from the police. As
Kohler points out, the rights the Constitution secures for each citizen "are
what makes America America," 201 and when police trample those rights,
rather than conduct more targeted investigations, they commit the very evil
the Constitution's Framers sought to guard against-just with better technology.

199. Id.
200. See id.
201. Id. (internal quotations omitted).

